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Abstract
Background: Global constitutionalism is a way of looking at the world, at global rules and how they are made, as if
there was a global constitution, empowering global institutions to act as a global government, setting rules which
bind all states and people.
Analysis: This essay employs global constitutionalism to examine how and why global health governance, as currently
structured, has struggled to advance the right to health, a fundamental human rights obligation enshrined in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It first examines the core structure of the global health
governance architecture, and its evolution since the Second World War. Second, it identifies the main constitutionalist
principles that are relevant for a global constitutionalism assessment of the core structure of the global health
governance architecture. Finally, it applies these constitutionalist principles to assess the core structure of the global
health governance architecture.
Discussion: Leading global health institutions are structurally skewed to preserve high incomes countries’
disproportionate influence on transnational rule-making authority, and tend to prioritise infectious disease control
over the comprehensive realisation of the right to health.
Conclusion: A Framework Convention on Global Health could create a classic division of powers in global health
governance, with WHO as the law-making power in global health governance, a global fund for health as the
executive power, and the International Court of Justice as the judiciary power.
Keywords: Global health governance, Global constitutionalism, Health security, Right to health
Background
Global constitutionalism is a school of thought in inter-
national law and international relations studies. According
to Falk, global constitutionalism is about the “extension of
constitutional thinking to world order” [1]. The “familiar
solution”, or so argues Falk, would be “the establishment
of a world government with centralized institutions
equipped with coercive machinery”. But it would be a mis-
take “to reduce the perspective of global constitutionalism
to governmental alternatives to the state system”: [1] con-
stitutional thinking can be applied to global governance
that does not take the form of a global government.
Global health governance, defined by Fidler as “the use of
formal and informal institutions, rules, and processes by
states, intergovernmental organizations, and nonstate ac-
tors to deal with challenges to health that require cross-
border collective action to address effectively”, [2] includes
several institutions that have been given (or have captured)
the power to set norms that are either binding, or difficult
to disregard, for many states. In recent years, several com-
prehensive studies of global health governance have been
published; [3–5] they contain many critical comments, and
rightfully so, in our opinion. However, in the absence of a
consensual or widely shared opinion as to what global
health governance should do, critical comments regarding
how and why it is failing are both less forceful and less
persuasive than they could be. This is why we think
global constitutionalism, used as an analytical lens,
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could be helpful, in addressing the question of whether
global health governance lives up to basic constitutional
principles. As far as we know, global constitutionalism
analysis has not yet been applied to global health govern-
ance, a study by Hawkins and Howe on the impact of bi-
lateral trade agreements on global health excepted [6].
To avoid confusion, it is worth noting that there is a
difference between global constitutionalisation and glo-
bal constitutionalism. Global constitutionalisation refers
to the gestation of a system of institutions that have
been given (or captured) rule-making authority at a level
above the state. Global constitutionalism critically exam-
ines that gestational process, looking for its successes
and failures in living up to the minimum standards one
would expect from a global constitutional order. In that
respect, we do not entirely agree with Hawkins and
Howe when they describe global constitutionalism as an
“approach to governance which sees ‘constitutionalisation’
of the global sphere as a necessary and positive process”
[6]. Global constitutionalism also “uncovers legitimacy
deficits” in the process of global constitutionalisation,
and “suggests remedies” [7]. Indeed, many global constitu-
tionalism scholars share a feeling of discontentment about
the ‘Westphalian’ world order of sovereign and independ-
ent states, resulting in a state of anarchy-absence of
authority-at the global level, and are therefore inclined to
view steps away from that anarchy with a benevolent eye.
But they are aware that the thirst for ‘global rule of law’
risks “validating” undemocratic global institutions and
“promoting dangerously seductive “over-expectations” [8].
In any case, our main interest in a global constitutionalism
analysis lies in its potential to allow “extreme inequality in
the world to be not only shown but also condemned” [9].
This essay first examines the core structure of the global
health governance architecture, and its evolution since the
Second World War. Second, it identifies the main consti-
tutionalist principles that are relevant for a global consti-
tutionalism assessment of the core structure of the global
health governance architecture. Finally, it applies these
constitutionalist principles to assess the core structure of
the global health governance architecture.
Analysis
I. The core structure of the global health governance
architecture
Applying a global constitutionalism analysis to global
health governance requires that we first define what we
mean with global health governance. We start from Fidler’s
definition, already mentioned above, according to which
global health governance “refers to the use of formal and
informal institutions, rules, and processes by states, inter-
governmental organizations, and nonstate actors to deal
with challenges to health that require cross-border collect-
ive action to address effectively” [2]. However, for a global
constitutionalism analysis, we are concerned only with in-
stitutions that have received or captured some authority to
make rules that supersede national rules, and therefore our
analysis excludes private for-profit and not-for-profit actors
and governmental agencies that engage chiefly in bilateral
agreements. In line with Youde’s and Harman’s books on
global health governance, [3, 4] our analysis focuses on two
leading intergovernmental organisations, the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the World Bank, and the so-
called new global health actors: the global health initiatives
(GHIs) that have popped up since the turn of the millen-
nium. For the sake of parsimony, our analysis will focus on
the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
(Global Fund).
In 1946, WHO was created and mandated to promote
“the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible
level of health”, and to work to “control of disease, espe-
cially communicable disease” [10]. WHO was accorded
the power to elaborate international law to achieve both
elements of its broad mandate. However, it has exercised
its legislative powers mainly in relation to the so-called
health security purpose: the International Sanitary Regu-
lations of 1951, revised and renamed International Health
Regulations (IHR) in 1969, and again revised in 2005 [11].
WHO’s most ambitious plan for promoting equitable ac-
cess to essential healthcare, the practical expression of its
mandate to ensure the highest possible level of health for
all, was the Global Strategy for Health for All by the Year
2000, [12] based on the 1978 Declaration of Alma-Ata
[13]. This strategy, however, was not translated into inter-
national law.
The Global Strategy for Health for All by the Year
2000 upset the USA and some other powerful states,
which turned their back on WHO and started relying on
the World Bank for global health governance [14]. The
“greater funding power” of the World Bank allowed it to
displace the WHO as the major influence behind health
policy in poor countries [15]. Even before the Declar-
ation was ‘translated’ into the Global Strategy for Health
for All by the Year 2000-in 1981-some scholars had pro-
posed “selective primary health care” as an “interim
strategy” [16]. The World Bank never formally endorsed
selective Primary Health Care (PHC) as its preferred
strategy. However, World Bank financial support to de-
veloping countries has always come with conditions, and
in the 1980s, these conditions became known as ‘struc-
tural adjustment’, which included conditions on (reducing)
public social expenditure. Several scholars argue that
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) thus forced
developing countries to accept the selective PHC ap-
proach [17, 18]. SAPs are also blamed for pushing de-
veloping countries towards excessive reliance on ‘user
fees’ or charges for health care services. Formally intro-
duced by the 1987 Bamako Initiative, adopted by the
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WHO’s African regional organisation, user fees were
intended to deal “with the severe economic crises facing
sub-Saharan Africa, the negative effects of adjustment
programmes on health, and the reluctance of donors to
continue to fund recurrent costs of primary health care
programmes” [19].
The publication in 1993 of the World Bank’s World
Development Report ‘Investing in Health’ “reflected a
marked change in the orientation of how healthcare ser-
vices in resource-poor countries would be delivered” [20].
In this report, the World Bank introduced a separation be-
tween “public health”, “essential clinical services”, and “the
rest of the health system” [21]. While the report clearly
recommended increasing public investment in public
health measures-like selective PHC, all focused on infec-
tious disease control-and clearly recommended that “the
rest of the health system” be financed privately, it was am-
biguous on the financing of “essential clinical services”, re-
ferring to the early successes of the Bamako Initiative as
an alternative option to public financing. The World
Bank’s health sector reform strategy brought together ele-
ments of selective PHC, SAPs and the Bamako Initiative.
According to Gostin, the World Bank’s ‘Investing in
Health’ report “marked the zenith of its global health in-
fluence, promoting reforms meant to improve equity, effi-
ciency and effectiveness” [22].
By the end of the 1990s, the flaws in the World Bank’s
health sector strategy became apparent, particularly in
low-income countries, which proved unable-or insuffi-
ciently resourced-to address the growing pandemic of
HIV/AIDS effectively, or to integrate immunisation pro-
grams, previously financed by the international commu-
nity, within their health systems [23]. The ‘financial
slimming’ exercise of the SAPs proved to be problematic,
not only from an equitable access to essential care per-
spective, but also from a health security perspective. The
turn of the millennium saw a proliferation of GHIs, also
known as public-private partnerships (PPPs) which sought
largely to address communicable diseases. According to
Harmer and Buse, they were “a nascent experiment in glo-
bal health” in the late 1990s, but “now they are part of
mainstream global health discourse and a dominant
model for cooperation in a complex world” [24]. If
“greater funding power” is what allowed the World Bank
to displace the WHO as the major influence behind health
policy in poor countries, as Abbasi argues, [15] then it
should be noted that two GHIs have caught up with or
even surpassed the World Bank in funding power: the
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI)
and the Global Fund [25].
Global health governance continued to evolve after the
creation of the Global Fund and GAVI. Every year, new
GHIs are created, while few cease operations. In Hill’s
words, global health governance is, and will remain, a
complex adaptive system [26]. Nevertheless, we would
argue that the combination of WHO, the World Bank,
and the Global Fund (as an example of a major GHI)
provides a representative sample of the core structure of
the global health governance architecture, sufficient at
least for an initial global constitutionalism assessment.
II. Global constitutionalism (constitutionalist principles,
applicable at the global level, relevant for global health
governance)
Having demarcated the core structure of the global
health governance architecture as the subject of our
analysis, we need to clarify the constitutionalist princi-
ples we will use for our analysis. Unfortunately, there is
no widely accepted definition of global constitutionalism.
Besson writes (about international constitutionalism):
“Promoted since the 1930s in Europe and rediscovered
in the 1990s, it has meant different things to different
people, has been promoted for very different reasons,
and has also been criticized on many different grounds”
[27]. Werner argues: “The vocabulary of constitutionalism
has been used in different contexts and for different
purposes, varying from in-depth critiques of existing
international law to attempts to explain the rise of inter-
national tribunals, the revitalisation of international organi-
sations, the self-understanding of European organisations
in terms of constitutionalism or the development of a core
of fundamental values in international law” [28]. However,
in spite of this lack of consensus, there are three themes,
or constitutionalist principles, that are common to most
global constitutionalism analysis and research, and that
seem relevant for our assessment of the core structure of
the global health governance architecture.
 The degree to which rule-making authority is received
or captured by global institutions is important to
distinguish between ‘ordinary’ cooperation between
states-presumably based on voluntary cooperation
between equal, sovereign states, the kind of cooperation
that Oye would call “cooperation under anarchy”
[29] – and a new kind of cooperation under which
states are, at times, obliged to follow the rules set at
the global level, i.e., the process known as global
constitutionalisation.
 The democratic legitimacy of the institutions to
which rule-making power is conferred is important
to assess whether the loss of sovereignty that
occurs under global constitutionalisation is being
‘compensated’-or not-by genuine participation in
the decision-making processes.
 Human rights law, or the degree to which human
rights are realised through rules set by global
institutions, is used to assess the quality of the rules
set by global institutions: like national rules that
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violate the basic rights enshrined in the constitution
are called ‘unconstitutional’, global rules that violate
international human rights law can be called ‘un-
global-constitutional’.
With regards to rule-making authority, most global
constitutionalism analyses focus on global institutions
that have received a more or less formal mandate to
elaborate, promulgate or implement international law.
The purpose of that focus is to distinguish between
trans-national arrangements that continue to rely on
voluntary cooperation between equal sovereign states-
because states can at any moment step in or step out of
the arrangement-and arrangements under which states
give up at least part of their sovereignty-because once
they adhere to the arrangement, they cannot easily with-
drawn, and therefore at times decisions will be taken
without their consent. Only the latter form of arrange-
ments is of interest for global constitutionalism analysis,
as it implies the gestation of a decision-making level
above the state. With regards to global health, however,
we would argue that we need to look beyond international
law in the strict sense. As we will discuss further below,
only WHO received a formal mandate to elaborate, prom-
ulgate or implement international law. The World Bank,
and the Global Fund cannot formally impose the policies
they develop on states; at least in theory states can opt
out, or stick to the policies they prefer. In reality, however,
the opportunity cost of not adhering to World Bank or
Global Fund policy can be very high, in particular for low-
income countries that are highly dependent on the inter-
national assistance that comes with policy adherence.
WHO too often uses policy advice that does not formally
bind its member states, but that nonetheless comes with
consequences attached to non-adherence. Therefore, our
analysis looks beyond international law in the strict sense,
to include policy that is binding in the broader sense:
policy that states cannot reject without risking serious
consequences. In legal jargon, our approach is in line
with Klabbers’ definition of “global administrative law”,
[30] and Allott’s definition of “new international law” [31].
While the importance of democratic legitimacy is easy
to understand, whenever states are actively or passively
transferring a substantial part of their decision-making
powers to international or global organisations, it is less
easy to capture the requirements of democratic legitim-
acy at the global level. The principle of sovereign equal-
ity, on which the United Nations (UN) system is built,
leads directly to a ‘one country one vote’ principle, as
the yardstick of democratic legitimacy. When assessed
from a more cosmopolitan perspective, following a ‘one
person one vote’ principle is equally problematic as it ac-
cords each inhabitant of a very sparsely populated coun-
try more clout on the global stage than each inhabitant
of the most populated country. Soon after the founda-
tion of the UN, a committee of 11 scholars, most of
them affiliated with the University of Chicago, who felt
that the UN was not democratic enough, developed a
Preliminary draft of a World Constitution, which pro-
posed the creation of a Federal Republic of the World,
with a Federal Convention consisting of “delegates elected
directly by the people of all states and nations, one dele-
gate for each million of population or fraction thereof
above one-half million” [32]. The idea of a Federal Repub-
lic of the World has never been seriously considered by
the international community, but the ‘1,000.000 persons
one vote’ approach is still useful as an alternative way to
measure democratic legitimacy. Meanwhile, the intellec-
tual search for democratic legitimacy at the global level
continues, [33–37] and is currently focused on the inclu-
sion of ‘civil society’. As Besson expresses it: “Indeed, once
the multilateral and multilevel international political
community is understood as a pluralistic community of
communities and as a hybrid community of states and
individuals, the equivalence of sources and the plurality
of specific regimes within international law becomes a
democratic requirement” [27]. In other words, to claim
democratic legitimacy, global institutions should include
civil society representatives in their decision-making bod-
ies. Last but not least, to claim democratic legitimacy a
global institution should, in our opinion, not only take de-
cisions in line with the opinion of the people or countries
it represents, it should also have the power to ensure
that those decisions are implemented by all concerned.
Both the ‘demos’ (‘people’ in ancient Greek) and ‘kratos’
(‘power’ in ancient Greek) are essential: a government
that is taking a decision to impose a tax on the proper-
ties of the wealthiest members of the population, in ac-
cordance with the majority opinion, but unable to make
the wealthiest people pay the tax, is not a truly democratic
government: in the end, the minority decides to pay the
tax, or not. As we will discuss further below, this is the
main obstacle blocking institutions at the core of the
global health governance architecture from claiming demo-
cratic legitimacy.
Finally, with regards to human rights law and the real-
isation of the right to health in particular, we should
clarify our understanding of the right to health. Like
other international legal scholars, our definition of the
right to health flows from the legal basis of the right as
enshrined in the 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (Covenant),[38] and expanded upon in the
2000 General Comment 14 issued by the UN Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Committee)
[39]. The right to health is not a right to be healthy but a
legitimate claim to certain freedoms and entitlements,
[40] such as the entitlements to water, food, housing
and healthcare. It enshrines fundamental human rights
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principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination,
transparency and shared responsibility: national and inter-
national obligations, the latter related to development as-
sistance and cooperation for health. The importance of
the concept of ‘core obligations’ – what states need to do
to realise minimum essential levels of the right to health-
and the existence of international obligations of assistance
from wealthier states to states that are unable to live up to
their core obligations, are both of vital importance for ad-
vancing the right to health for all [41, 42]. When using
constitutionalist principles to assess global health govern-
ance, we would argue that the realisation of these mini-
mum essential levels, through shared national and
international responsibility, is the minimum standard by
which achievements, or lack thereof, of global health gov-
ernance should be assessed, before one can claim that glo-
bal health governance is or is not constitutional. For
reasons explained further below, it is important to high-
light that infectious disease control is an essential element
of the right to health. It is mentioned explicitly in the
Covenant-article 12.2.(c): “The prevention, treatment and
control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other dis-
eases” – and, in General Comment 14 – paragraph 44.(c):
“To take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic
and endemic diseases”. However, the core content of the
right to health is more comprehensive than infectious dis-
ease control. Thus, wheninternational cooperation, or pol-
icy, developed by the global institutions at the core of the
global health governance architecture, is primarily con-
cerned with infectious disease control this cooperation or
policy contributes only partially, and selectively, to the
realisation of the right to health.
III. Applying a global constitutionalism analysis to the core
structure of the global health governance architecture
III.1. Rule-making authority
WHO Of the three global institutions analysed here,
only WHO has a formal mandate to elaborate or promul-
gate international law. Article 19 of the WHO constitution
grants the World Health Assembly (WHA) “authority to
adopt conventions or agreements with respect to any mat-
ter within the competence of the [WHO]”, “which shall
come into force for each Member when accepted by it in
accordance with its constitutional processes” [10]. In other
words: article 19 of WHO’s constitution is the legal basis
for it to prepare and elaborate international law on all
health issues, but its member states are free to ratify the
resulting conventions or treaties, or not. Article 21 accords
the WHA the authority “to adopt regulations” concerning
specific international health issues: “(a) sanitary and quar-
antine requirements and other procedures designed to pre-
vent the international spread of disease; (b) nomenclatures
with respect to diseases, causes of death and public health
practices; (c) standards with respect to diagnostic
procedures for international use; (d) standards with respect
to the safety, purity and potency of biological, pharmaceut-
ical and similar products moving in international com-
merce; (e) advertising and labelling of biological,
pharmaceutical and similar products moving in inter-
national commerce.” [10] According to article 22, “[r]egula-
tions adopted pursuant to Article 21 shall come into force
for all Members after due notice has been given of their
adoption by the Health Assembly except for such Mem-
bers as may notify the Director-General of rejection or res-
ervations within the period stated in the notice” [10]. In
other words: articles 21 and 22 of WHO’s constitution
are the legal basis for its authority to prepare and elab-
orate international law on specific health issues, which
is binding for all member states, except those who expli-
citly reject it (which comes at a diplomatic cost).
WHO’s use of this double mandate has been selective.
WHO used the mandate enshrined in articles 21 and 22
of its constitution to promulgate the International
Sanitary Regulations of 1951, revised and renamed the
International Health Regulations (IHR) in 1969, and
again-now more thoroughly-revised in 2005 [8]. Five
member states made reservations, no member state
rejected the revised IHR. WHO has used the mandate
enshrined in article 19 of the WHO constitution only
once, when it negotiated the Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control (FCTC) [43]. Out of 194 WHO mem-
ber states, 179 are parties to the FCTC.
As mentioned above, WHO’s most ambitious plan for
promoting equitable access to essential healthcare, the
practical expression of its mandate to ensure the highest
possible level of health for all, was the Global Strategy
for Health for All by the Year 2000, [12] based on the
1978 Declaration of Alma-Ata [13]. WHO did not
‘translate’ the Global Strategy for Health for All by the
Year 2000 into binding international law. Instead, it used
non-binding instruments: a WHA resolution in May
1981, [12] followed by a UN General Assembly resolution
in October 1981 [44]. With a non-binding instrument, we
mean a document like a declaration, resolution or code, in
which states agree on a common objective, and on means
to achieve that objective, without making a formal com-
mitment to do what it takes to achieve the commitment.
As discussed above, we do not consider it appropriate to
exclude non-binding instruments from a global constitu-
tionalism assessment of global health governance, as some
of them come with important financial rewards, making it
very difficult for some countries to reject them. However,
WHO’s non-binding instruments do not fit in that cat-
egory, as WHO was never set up to become a channel of
international health financing, and does not have the fi-
nancial clout to ‘buy compliance’.
WHO made several other attempts to contribute to
the realisation of the right to health via non-binding
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treaties. For example, in 2004, WHA resolution 57.19 re-
quested the WHO Director-General to develop “a code
of practice on the international recruitment of health
personnel, especially from developing countries” [45]. A
footnote in this resolution mentioned explicitly: “It is
understood that, within the United Nations system, the
expression “code of practice” refers to instruments that are
not legally binding.” Nonetheless, some scholars, including
Taylor-one of the main proponents of the (binding) FCTC-
argue that the WHO Global Code of Practice on the Inter-
national Recruitment of Health Personnel (Global Code)
“incorporates procedural mechanisms to advance imple-
mentation that are more potent than those incorporated in
the FCTC” and that “[w]hile both the FCTC and the
WHO Global Code set forth a shallow substantive frame-
work, the WHO Global Code sets forth a deep legal and
institutional framework” [46]. Another example: in 2008,
the WHA adopted resolution 61.21 on a “Global Strategy
and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intel-
lectual Property”,[47] which requested the WHO Director-
General “to establish urgently a results-oriented and time-
limited expert working group to examine current financing
and coordination of research and development”. The Con-
sultative Expert Working Group on Research and Develop-
ment (R&D): Financing and Coordination (CEWG) that
was created recommended that governments begin negoti-
ations on a global medical R&D convention [48]. But even
the Chair and the Vice-Chair of the CEWG expressed
doubts about the kind of instrument that would fulfil the
objectives best: “Some argue that the only way to get agree-
ment on strong and specific enough measures is through
soft laws, since hard laws often end with watered down
commitments, and that soft law thereby can achieve more”.
Although they continue to argue for a “legally binding in-
strument with clear commitments; a new international
convention”, [49] it seems rather unlikely that a convention
will be agreed upon in the near future.
The World Bank The World Bank has no formal
mandate to elaborate or prepare international law in the
strict sense, but it has money to back up its recommen-
dations. Neither SAPs, nor the 1986 ‘Financing health
services in developing countries: an agenda for reform’
paper, [50] nor the 1993 ‘Investing in Health’ report, [21]
can be considered as international law in the strict sense.
However, for poorer countries, the cost of non-compliance
was high: not adopting a World Bank and International
Monetary Fund (IMF) approved SAP meant being excluded
from support from the ‘soft loan arm’ of the World Bank,
namely the International Development Association (IDA).
In addition, often it also meant dwindling international
financial support from many high-income countries that
considered the absence of a SAP as a sign of irresponsible
governance. As Lee and Goodman emphasise, “a key
feature of SAPs was the policy condition to reduce public
expenditure on the social sectors including health” [51].
It should be mentioned that, by the end of the 1990s,
the World Bank softened its policies. At least in theory,
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) that re-
placed the SAPs are ‘country owned’, developed by the
countries themselves. They should therefore be less inva-
sive with regards to the national policy space. Opinions
on whether PRSPs are truly different from SAPs vary [52].
What matters, for our analysis, is that as with SAPs,
non-compliance with PRSPs comes with a serious cost.
When assessing the rule-making authority of the
World Bank, it is also important to recognise that coun-
tries that contribute to the World Bank relinquish their
discretionary power over the use of the money they pro-
vide. In fact, they even give up some discretionary power
over the amount of money they provide to the World
Bank. The key instrument of World Bank aid is the IDA,
and about 70 % of the IDA’s financial resources come
from high-income countries via ‘replenishments’ – the
high-income economy IDA members are supposed to
contribute, more or less in accordance with their Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). Weiss describes the process-
with regards to the USA-as follows: “IDA replenishments
comprise two distinct phases: negotiating the replenish-
ment round and annual contributions. First, the donor
nations negotiate the overall amount of a 3 year replen-
ishment, individual donor contributions, and general
policy considerations for the round. Following this,
each member country seeks annual contributions, typ-
ically through its legislative process, to meet their IDA
commitments” [53]. And he continues: “the United
States is obligated to contribute the amount agreed to
at the replenishment” [53]. Thus the World Bank captured
some rule-making authority from high-income countries.
The Global Fund The Global Fund, like the World
Bank, has no formal mandate to elaborate or prepare
international law in the strict sense. Furthermore, it was
created with the explicit intention of financing interven-
tions and programs designed at the national level, thus
increasing national policy space by increasing available
resources [54]. Over the years, however, through its de-
cisions about funding or not funding certain proposals,
and several documents guiding the preparation of pro-
posals, the Global Fund has developed its own policy. The
cost for poorer countries of not ‘complying’ with Global
Fund policy is similar, albeit less severe, than the cost of
not complying with World Bank policy: forfeiting substan-
tial amounts of international financing. (With less severe,
we mean that the costs of non-compliance with Global
Fund policy is limited to forfeiting Global Fund financing,
while the cost of non-compliance with the World Bank’s
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health sector policy could extend beyond the health
sector.)
Furthermore, the creation of a global fund with a
mandate limited to three infectious diseases is in and of
itself a strong engine for health sector development that
emphasises infectious disease control. It should be noted
that at least some countries wanted the Global Fund to
be a global fund for health from the onset [55]. Thus,
the implicit decision by the Global Fund Board not to go
in that direction can be seen as a global level decision
that limits policy space at the national level.
Are the countries, and private entities, that contribute
financial resources to the Global Fund also giving up
some of their decision-making power? The answer is yes,
at least in relation to the money they contribute, they
accept that the Global Fund’s decision-making mecha-
nisms determines allocations. But with regards to the size
of their contributions, they retain their discretionary
power. Like the World Bank-or more precisely, the
IDA-the Global Fund is financed through replenishments.
The difference between both is subtle, but significant:
while contributions to the IDA follow a GDP-based
burden-sharing key that has been respected by and
large over several replenishments, the Global Fund pro-
poses different scenarios of “illustrative contributions” –
pro rata to earlier contributions, based on shares of fund-
ing to IDA, based on adjusted Gross National Income
(GNI) – which are, at best, informative [56]. Thus, unlike
the World Bank, the level of contributions to the Global
Fund remains a matter of discretionary choice by the
contributing states.
Summary:
All of the three institutions we identified as comprising
the core structure of the global health governance archi-
tecture (with the Global Fund as an example of GHIs)
have been given, or have managed to capture, rule-making
authority at a level above the state-level. WHO received a
formal mandate to promulgate international law. The
World Bank and the Global Fund do not have such a
mandate, but they have financial resources that make it
difficult for poorer countries to not comply. Further-more,
the World Bank has also captured some rule-making au-
thority from wealthier countries, in the sense that it can
rely on financial contributions that are based on wealthier
countries’ GDP and are thus not entirely discretionary.
III.2. Democratic legitimacy
WHO The highest governing body of the WHO is the
WHA, where each member state has one vote. For that
reason, it is often considered as the most democratic
global health institution; according to Harmer, it is “per-
haps the only global health institution that still retains
the vestige of democracy” [55]. However, when assessed
from a more cosmopolitan perspective, using a ‘one
person one vote’ principle, it is problematic that the in-
habitants of small countries have, together, as many
votes as the inhabitants of countries with a much bigger
population. For example, the 11 million inhabitants of
Belgium-the country where both authors live-have one
vote (together), and the 316 million inhabitants of the
USA also have one vote (together). The voting power of
the average inhabitant of Belgium is thus 30 times stron-
ger than the voting power of the average inhabitant of
the USA.
Furthermore, as mentioned above, most scholars in-
volved in the search for global democracy now agree that,
one way or the other, civil society organisations should be
included in the decision-making processes of global insti-
tutions. For WHO, the challenge of including civil society
in its decision-making processes seems to be a never-
ending saga. In 2010, Kickbusch and colleagues suggested
the creation of a ‘Committee C’ within WHO, to give both
civil society and the private sector a space and a voice
[57]. The proposal was not accepted as such, but probably
was the trigger for discussions that lead to the adoption of
a new “WHO framework on engagement with non-state
actors” at the May 2016 WHA meeting. In the words of
Director-General Margaret Chan, “[t]he framework on en-
gagement with non-state actors was arguably the most dif-
ficult item to negotiate” [58]. It is too soon to assess the
impact of this new framework.
However, the main reason why we would be reluctant
to confer democratic legitimacy to WHO lies in the sec-
ond part of the word demo-cracy. A democratic institu-
tion should have the power to make all its members or
its entire constituency abide by the decisions taken by
the majority. The events following the Global Strategy
for Health for All by the Year 2000 illustrate WHO’s
powerlessness when it comes to implementing a strategy
that is widely supported by most poorer and many wealth-
ier states, but frowned upon by a handful of wealthier
states. Not only does WHO lack the financial resources to
back up its policies, it is itself dependent-and increasingly
so-on the discretionary financial support of a handful of
wealthier countries [59].
The World Bank The highest governing bodies of the
World Bank’s institutions-the World Bank is a common
name for the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), International Finance Corporation
(IFC), the IDA, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency (MIGA) – are the Board of Governors and the
Board of Directors. Voting rights depend on the number
of shares countries acquired: using the same countries as
above to illustrate this, the ‘one dollar, one vote’ approach
leads to the USA having 10 % of the total voting rights,
while Belgium has 1 % of the voting rights. So, at first
sight, the World Bank appears as less democratic than
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WHO from a sovereign equality perspective, but more
democratic from a cosmopolitan perspective: the voting
rights of the average inhabitant of Belgium are only 3
times greater than the voting rights of the average inhabit-
ant of the USA (as opposed to 30 times greater in WHO).
However, our illustration would be incomplete without in-
cluding poorer countries (with fewer shares). Burundi, a
country with the same population as Belgium, has 0.2 % of
the voting rights. Nigeria, the country with the highest
population in Africa – 17 times as many inhabitants as
Belgium – has 0.4 % of the voting rights. The voting rights
of the average inhabitant of Belgium are 40 times greater
than s the voting rights of the average inhabitant of
Nigeria. Even from a cosmopolitan perspective, the demo-
cratic legitimacy of the World Bank is highly questionable.
Civil society has no voting rights in the World Bank.
Since 2008, together with the IMF, the World Bank or-
ganises a Civil Society Policy Forum at the same time as
its biannual Board of Governors meetings [60]. Whether
this forum really influences World Bank policy remains
to be seen, but we nonetheless consider it an interesting
development. For example, in October 2016, Oxfam, the
ONE Campaign, and Save the Children, used the Civil
Society Policy Forum to challenge the World Bank on
its ambiguity when it comes to financing UHC [61].
When it comes to the question of possessing the
power to make its members abide by decisions taken
together, the World Bank is obviously the most ‘cratic’
global health governance institution-we are reluctant to
call it demo-cratic because of the distribution of voting
rights. The World Bank acquired financial autonomy to a
large extent, partly because of its own resources (reim-
bursement of loans), and partly because of the standing
practice of GDP-based contributions to the IDA replen-
ishments. The World Bank has far less to fear than WHO
(and the Global Fund, as will be discussed further below),
that wealthier countries could turn their backs, and close
their wallets, if it pursues f policies these countries dislike.
But then again, the chance that the World Bank adopts
and promotes policies disliked by wealthier countries is
small, given the distribution of voting rights.
The Global Fund The Board of the Global Fund is the
highest governing body of the Global Fund. On the
Global Fund Board, countries are grouped together into
constituencies: half of them represent the providers of
international financing, the other half represent the re-
cipients or potential recipients of international financing.
(Several countries that have either indicated that they will
no longer apply for Global Fund funding, or that are no
longer eligible because of the Global Fund’s policies, re-
main on the ‘recipient side’: for example, Brazil and
China.) Thus about 20 high-income countries have as
many votes as about 170 low-and middle-income countries:
not quite democratic from an sovereign equality perspec-
tive. From a cosmopolitan perspective, we will use the same
countries as above to illustrate the situation. The USA has
its own seat on the Global Fund Board, with one vote,
or 5 % of all the votes. Burundi is a member of the
Eastern and Southern Africa constituency, together
with 19 other countries, so we could say that it has 5 %
of a vote, or 0.25 % of all the votes. Nigeria is a member
of the West and Central Africa constituency, together
with 21 other countries, so we could say that it has 4.5 %
of a vote, or 0.23 % of all the votes. Belgium is a member
of the constituency with Italy, Portugal and Spain, which
includes the European Commission (EC) as well, which
makes it difficult to calculate the voting rights-should we
consider the EC as one entity, or as the representative of
all members of the European Union (of which most would
then be represented twice)? If we consider Belgium as one
of five members of this constituency, it has 20 % of its
constituency’s vote, or 1.25 % of all votes. When we then
divide the voting rights of each of these four countries by
the number of inhabitants, we can say that the average in-
habitant of Belgium has 0.000 000 039 % of the votes, the
average inhabitant of Burundi has 0.000 000 012 % of the
votes, the average inhabitant of Nigeria has 0.000 000
011 % of the votes, and the average inhabitant of the
USA has 0.000 000 016 % of the votes. The biggest dif-
ference here is between Belgium and Nigeria: the voting
rights of average inhabitant of Belgium are about 4
times greater than the voting rights of the average in-
habitant of Nigeria: far less than the biggest difference
at WHO (where the voting rights of the average inhab-
itant of Belgium are about 30 times greater than the
has voting rights of the average inhabitant of the USA)
or at the World Bank (where the voting rights of the
average inhabitant of Belgium are about 40 times greater
than the voting rights of the average inhabitant of
Nigeria). This is, of course, a purely mathematical ap-
proach, with little political meaning, but we nonetheless
find it interesting to see how a constituency approach
can find a middle ground, in between the sovereign
equality and cosmopolitan approaches.
More important, in our opinion, are the non-state
constituencies of the Global Fund: foundations have a
vote on the board, as does the private sector, civil society
of developed countries, civil society of developing coun-
tries, and communities affected by the three diseases.
Whether the inclusion-with voting rights-of these non-
state actors increases or decreases the democratic legit-
imacy of the Global Fund is food for a separate debate.
Some would argue that the private sector already has
too much indirect influence, without being formally in-
cluded in matters of global public governance. Even the
inclusion of civil society raises questions. As Tallberg and
Uhlin note (on civil society and international organizations
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in general, not about the Global Fund in particular):
“[a]mong civil society actors, well-organized and well-
funded [Non-Governmental Organizations] tend to be
overrepresented, whereas marginalized groups from de-
veloping countries tend to be highly underrepresented”
[37]. We presume that people with an inclination to the
sovereign equality principle look rather unfavourably
upon the Global Fund’s democratic legitimacy, while
people with an inclination towards the cosmopolitan ap-
proach will notice the attempt to create “a plurality of spe-
cific regimes”, in line with Besson, [27] with a benevolent
eye.
However, to complete the assessment of the Global
Fund’s democratic legitimacy, we cannot ignore that it is
and remains, even more then WHO, dependent on discre-
tionary financial support from the wealthier countries. In
theory, the Board of the Global Fund could decide to ex-
pand its mandate and to become a global fund for health,
as some countries wanted it to be from the beginning
[55]. If all constituencies would agree, except, for example,
Australia and the UK (one vote together), the USA, France
and Germany (one vote each), all the others would still
have a majority, on the ‘recipient side’ and on the ‘con-
tributor side’. In reality, it would be sufficient for two or
three of these countries to warn that they would end their
contributions, to make all the other countries abandon
their attempt.
Summary:
In our opinion, none of the three institutions we iden-
tified as comprising the core structure of the global
health governance architecture can claim democratic le-
gitimacy. WHO appears as the most democratic from an
equal sovereignty perspective, the Global Fund appears
as the most democratic from a cosmopolitan perspec-
tive, but both lack the financial autonomy that would
allow them to pursue policies that are not approved by a
handful of wealthier countries. The World Bank has that
autonomy, at least to some extent, but its ‘one dollar
one vote’ distribution of voting rights mechanism rules
it out from possessing democratic legitimacy.
III.3. Contribution to the realisation of the right to health
WHO As mentioned above, the WHO was created in
1946 with a multi-pronged mandate, including a mandate
to promote “the attainment by all peoples of the highest
possible level of health” and a mandate to promote the
“control of disease, especially communicable disease” [10].
Until recently, this duality was reflected in the way the
WHO presented itself on its website: “In the 21st century,
health is a shared responsibility, involving equitable access
to essential care and collective defence against trans-
national threats.” During the first decades of its existence,
until the mid-1970s, the WHO’s focus was on disease con-
trol [2–5]. This focus can be explained by the historical
legacy of the WHO, by its technical capacities at the time,
but maybe also by the reality that disease control reflects
the shared interest of all its members best: advancing
equitable access to essential care is important mostly to
poorer countries, whereas infectious disease control is im-
portant for all countries. Furthermore, infectious disease
control is an essential element of the realisation of the
right to health, but the realisation of the right to health de-
mands much broader efforts.
WHO’s focus changed when Halfdan Mahler became
Director General. Davies calls this the ‘humanitarian’
phase of WHO, [5] we would rather call it a turn to ‘so-
cial justice’. Mahler himself remembers it as such, when
commenting on the Declaration: “The 1970s was a warm
decade for social justice. That’s why after Alma-Ata in
1978, everything seemed possible” [62]. The Declaration,
[13] and the WHO Global Strategy for Health for All by
the Year 2000,[12] can be viewed as marking the zenith
of the social justice phase of WHO, and perhaps they
constitute the most important contribution of WHO to
the realisation of the right to health, as we understand it.
Youde calls them “truly revolutionary”, while emphasis-
ing the shift from national to international or global re-
sponsibility they entailed: “Up to this point, health care
has generally been the sovereign domain of states”, and
“[b]y promoting the Alma-Ata Declaration and Health
for All by 2000, the assembled delegates sought to have
states declare that public health was no longer simply a
concern for national governments” [3]. The zenith of the
social justice phase of WHO, however, also marked the
beginning of the demise of WHO’s position as the leader
of global health governance. As noted above, some
wealthier countries, the USA first and perhaps foremost,
were not pleased with what they perceived as WHO ad-
vancing a political agenda, and started enabling the
World Bank to become the leader in global health gov-
ernance [17]. The next phase of the WHO, which Davies
calls ‘neoliberal’, [5] can perhaps best be understood as
an attempt to find a relevant role in the shadow of the
World Bank: “WHO had to quickly adapt its health
packages to help secure the deliverables that the World
Bank was expecting from health care programmes” [5].
Since the end of the 1990s, WHO has been trying to
reassert its role as the leader in global health governance
in what has become a rapidly changing landscape, in
large part due to the creation of many new GHIs, in-
cluding the Global Fund [5]. The promotion of Universal
Health Coverage (UHC) as the legitimate heir to PHC
can be understood as a return of the WHO towards its
earlier social justice phase. However, whereas the 1982
Plan of Action for Implementing the Global Strategy for
Health for All emphasised states’ responsibility to finance
PHC-states will “mobilize all possible financial and mater-
ial resources” [63] – the present WHO strategy on UHC
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emphasises risk pooling or avoiding out-of-pocket ex-
penditure: it does not seem to matter whether the finan-
cing is public or private, as long as it is not out-of-pocket.
From a right to health perspective, the responsibility to
finance UHC is a public responsibility. Furthermore,
when it comes to shared-national and international-
responsibility, the WHO guidance on UHC is far less
explicit than its guidance on primary health care used
to be. The 1982 Plan of Action for Implementing the
Global Strategy for Health for All explicitly included a
provision on shared responsibility providing that all
countries would “mobilize all possible financial and ma-
terial resources”; that “Member States requiring exter-
nal funds in addition to their own resources will clearly
identify those needs”; and that “[d]eveloped countries
will transfer resources to developing countries that are
ready to devote substantial additional resources to health,
and will review the nature of these transfers with a view to
complying with the needs of the Strategy” [63]. WHO
guidance on UHC only mentions that some low-income
countries will need assistance [42].
WHO could try to ‘translate’ its policy on UHC into
international law, on the basis of article 19 of its consti-
tution, [10] and include specific targets for domestic and
international financing. UHC, including targets for do-
mestic and international financing, is at the core of
Gostin’s proposal for a Framework Convention on Glo-
bal Health [64]. Keeping in mind what happened after
the Global Strategy for Health for All by the Year 2000,
we can understand WHO’s reluctance.
The World Bank As mentioned above, the World
Bank’s impact on global health-and its contribution to
the realization of the right to health-cannot be dissoci-
ated from its involvement with SAPs. Several scholars
argue SAPs obliged developing countries to abandon the
comprehensive PHC care approach and to accept the se-
lective PHC approach,[17, 18] although some argue that
“empirical studies present both positive and negative
outcomes of adjustment programs [on health]” [65]. In
any case, the 1987 World Bank report on ‘Financing Health
Services in Developing Countries’ explicitly mentioned that
“in most countries the general budget stringency makes it
difficult to argue for more public spending”, and did not
mention international financing as a solution to relax this
stringency [50]. This report also explicitly promoted the
introduction of user fees, making an exception only for
health services “with largely public benefits”, namely infec-
tious disease control, because “[c]onsumers are almost al-
ways willing to pay directly for health services with largely
private benefits”, but “are generally reluctant to pay directly
for programs and services which benefit society or commu-
nities as a whole” [50]. The logic behind that recommenda-
tion was reaffirmed in the World Bank’s 1993 World
Development Report on ‘Investing in Health’ [21]. As noted
above, in this report, the World Bank introduced a separ-
ation between “public health”, “essential clinical services”,
and “the rest of the health system”, and recommended in-
creasing public investment in public health measures fo-
cused on infectious disease control, recommended that
“the rest of the health system” be financed privately, and
remained ambiguous on the financing of “essential clinical
services” [21]. Coincidently or not, the ensuing health sec-
tor reforms resulted in international assistance being used
predominantly for what governments decided to finance
publicly at the national level, namely infectious disease con-
trol. In our opinion, the World Bank’s health sector reform
policies of the 1980s and 1990s, in combination with SAPs,
constituted violations of the right to health [66].
By the end of the 1990s, it became obvious that the
World Bank’s health sector reform strategy, emphasising
national self-reliance, had gone too far. While “[u]ntil
1990 the global effort to immunise the world’s children
had been a remarkable success story”, [23] the health
systems of low-income countries proved too weak to in-
tegrate immunisation programs previously financed by
the international community. These health systems were
also ill prepared for the pandemic of HIV/AIDS. Against
this backdrop, the new GHIs were created, including the
Global Fund.
In recent years, the World Bank has become a sup-
porter of UHC. This can be understood as a departure
from its earlier health financing strategies for poorer coun-
tries, or as an explanation for WHO’s ambiguity on public
or private responsibility for financing UHC. One can easily
imagine a form of UHC that is entirely in line with present
(ambiguous) definitions of UHC and the World Bank’s
1993 World Development Report on ‘Investing in Health’:
[21] one in which infectious diseases control is financed
through public resources, while the financing of all other
elements of UHC is left to private health insurance.
The Global Fund According to Davis, the “Global
Fund’s mandate-to direct resources to support the fight
against HIV, TB, and malaria-is grounded in a human
rights commitment: It supports governments in their ob-
ligation under the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) to progressively
realize the right to the highest attainable standard of
health” [67]. We agree that the Global Fund contributes to
the realisation of an important part of the right to health,
in a way that neither WHO nor the World Bank does:
WHO because it does not have the resources to do so (as
it was not designed to be a channel for international finan-
cing); the World Bank because it remains reluctant to
allow poorer countries to use international financing
for recurrent expenditure, as it considers international
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financing as unreliable in the long run [68]. This atti-
tude fails to appreciate that international financing of
healthcare in poorer countries is an integral part of the
right to health, and, it is also somewhat ironic, given
that the World Bank’s GDP-based replenishments put
it in an excellent position to provide reliable inter-
national financing. In any case, if the Global Fund had
adopted the same approach, it would not have financed
AIDS treatment-recurrent par excellence. Therefore,
the Global Fund is an embodiment of ‘shared responsi-
bility’, which is a key element of the right to health.
However, from a right to health perspective, it is not
easy to justify the Global Fund’s mandate being limited
to three diseases. Ever since the creation of the Global
Fund, attempts have been made from within the Secretar-
iat and members of the Board to broaden the mandate,
[55, 69] or at least to increase the Global Fund’s support
to wider health systems,[70] but the result of these at-
tempts has been disappointing.
Summary:
The Global Strategy for Health for all by the Year 2000
would have allowed WHO to claim a leadership award
in realising the right to health, if WHO would have had
the financial clout and autonomy to follow through on
implementation. The Global Strategy for Health for all
by the Year 2000 may have had a positive impact in
middle-income countries, freeing them from reliance on
World Bank and IMF support, but was derailed by SAPs
and health sector reform policies of the World Bank.
The World Bank’s track record in realising the right to
health is weak. The Global Fund can be seen as an em-
bodiment of ‘shared responsibility’, which is a key elem-
ent of the right to health. But its mandate, limited to
fighting three infectious diseases, stands in the way of it
claiming a leadership award in realising the right to
health.
Discussion
Health indeed appears as “one of the most dynamic
realms of global governance today”, [3] as Youde argues.
But the red thread that runs through our global consti-
tutionalism analysis is that the “different ways in which
the international community conceptualizes its respon-
sibility for addressing cross-border health concerns”,
[3] invariably lead us towards diseases that cross bor-
ders, not to global health inequalities that should be a
“cross-border health concern” in the moral sense.
Transnational rule-making authority has been conferred
to global health governance. WHO, the World Bank, and
the Global Fund, have received or captured part of the
policy space that used to be confined to national govern-
ments. While WHO has a mandate to elaborate and
promulgate international law, it has used it mainly for in-
fectious disease control: the IHR. The only exception so
far is the FCTC, which also addresses a cross-border
health concern that affects high-income countries directly.
The World Bank and the Global Fund acquired their rule-
making authority from the financial incentives they use to
back up policy recommendations.
In our opinion, none of the three institutions at the
core structure of the global health governance architec-
ture can claim democratic legitimacy. WHO is governed
in accordance with the ‘one country one vote’ principle,
but finds itself at the mercy of a handful of wealthier
states. These states accepted WHO as the leader of glo-
bal health governance as long as its work was focused
on infectious diseases. When the WHO strayed from
this focus, these states empowered the World Bank, in
particular through increased funding, to assume the glo-
bal lead, and the World Bank promoted health sector re-
form skewed towards infectious diseases control. When
that proved ineffective, GHIs were created and funded
to support infectious disease control. Applying constitu-
tional principles to global health governance leads us to
look for efforts to realise the right to health more broadly,
but we were disappointed: perhaps an illustration of what
Macdonald and Johnston had in mind when warning that
global constitutionalism “promotes dangerously seductive
“over-expectations” [8].
Thus, the only form of constitutionalism global health
governance can claim today would have the characteris-
tics of a ‘mixed constitution’, as defended in 1642 by
King Charles I of England, Scotland and Ireland, in re-
sponse to the XIX Propositions of his defiant parliament.
“There being three kindes of government amongst men,
Absolute Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, and
all of these having their particular conveniences and in-
conveniences”, [71] or so argued Charles I, a “mixture”
of these “kindes of government” would give England
“the conveniences of all three, without the inconve-
niences of any one”. Charles I then used his monarchic
powers, the House of the Lords (then called ‘House of
Peers’) and the House of Commons as he saw fit-probably
in the way most convenient for his purposes. It does not
require a wild imagination to see a similar power game in
global health governance today: the USA, and a handful of
wealthier countries, use WHO when they need it to create
buy-in from all other countries for infectious disease
control; they use the World Bank when they do not
need consent from other countries because they can
buy compliance, or they create new institutions.
Conclusion
According to Peters, global constitutionalism helps to
“uncovers legitimacy deficits” in the process of global
constitutionalisation, and also “suggests remedies” [7]. Our
global constitutionalism analysis has indeed uncovered le-
gitimacy deficits. Did it also suggest remedies? We think it
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did. It revealed that the lack of financial clout to back up
its policy stands in the way of WHO’s claim to democratic
legitimacy, while the Global Fund faces a similar problem
because of its dependence on discretionary contributions
from a handful of wealthier countries. Any real remedy
would have to address the underlying financial problem.
That is why we, in earlier work, insisted that the Global
Fund could only transform itself into a global fund for
health if contributions were made mandatory-in line with
international obligations arising from the right to health
[72]. Gostin’s proposal of a FCGH is even more ambitious,
as it would not only clarify national and international re-
sponsibilities for health financing in poorer countries, it
would also create financial autonomy for WHO [64]. If the
FCGH would also confer jurisdiction to the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) – meaning that in the event of a con-
flict arising from the implementation of the FCGH, states
would be able to seek a ruling from the ICJ-we would have
the classical tripartite division (or separation) of powers at
the global level, with WHO possessing the legislative (law-
making) power, the Global Fund (with a wider mandate)
possessing the executive power, and the ICJ the judiciary
power.
Unfortunately, our global constitutionalism analysis
also confirms Nagel’s doubts about the feasibility of glo-
bal health justice, arguing that “[w]e are unlikely to see
the spread of global justice in the long run unless we
first create strong supranational institutions that do not
aim at justice but that pursue common interests and re-
flect the inequalities of bargaining power among existing
states” [73]. This suggests we may have to put up with a
global health governance structure that is controlled by
a handful of powerful and wealthier countries for the
foreseeable future. Furthermore, the current political
climate-with global health security at the top of the glo-
bal health governance agenda, financial austerity, and a
turn towards nationalism in several parts of the world-
seems to be far from an ideal moment for an attempt to
make global health governance more democratic (whether
under the sovereign equality or cosmopolitan approach).
But we could also read Nagel in a way that recognises
that we have had strong supranational institutions that
pursue common interest (and reflect inequalities of bar-
gaining power) for long enough, and that they have grown
strong enough to be challenged on their democratic il-
legitimacy and failure to realise the right to health com-
prehensively. Furthermore, if one is of the opinion that
substantial modifications to any global governance regime
usually come from tension and struggle, rather than from
harmony and cooperation, the present time could be an
ideal moment for ‘a new global health deal’.
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